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Abstract
We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem
of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games
played on networks, as well as the problem of robustly optimizing a submodular function over the worst
case from a set of scenarios. The challenge in computing equilibria is that both players’ strategy spaces
can be exponentially large. Accordingly, previous algorithms have worst-case exponential runtime and
indeed fail to scale up on practical instances. We provide a pseudopolynomial-time algorithm which
obtains a guaranteed (1 − 1/e)2-approximate mixed strategy for the maximizing player. Our algorithm
only requires access to a weakened version of a best response oracle for the minimizing player which
runs in polynomial time. Experimental results for network security games and a robust budget allocation
problem confirm that our algorithm delivers near-optimal solutions and scales to much larger instances
than was previously possible.
Introduction
Submodular functions are ubiquitous due to wide-spread applications ranging from machine learning, to
viral marketing, to mechanism design. Intuitively, submodularity captures diminishing returns (formalized
later). In this paper, we use techniques rooted in submodular optimization to solve previously intractable
zero-sum games. We then show how to instantiate our algorithm for two specific games, including the robust
optimization of a submodular objective.
As an example, consider the network security game introduced by Tsai et al. [2010]. A defender can
place checkpoints on k edges of a graph. An attacker aims to travel from a source node to any one of
several targets without being intercepted. Each player has an exponential number of strategies since the
defender may choose any set of k edges and the attacker may choose any path. Hence, previous approaches
to computing the optimal defender strategy were either heuristics with no approximation guarantee, or else
provided guarantees but ran in worst-case exponential time [Jain et al., 2011, Iwashita et al., 2016].
However, this game has useful structure. The defender’s best response to any attacker mixed strategy
is to select the edges which are most likely to intersect the attacker’s chosen path. Computing this set is a
submodular optimization problem [Jain et al., 2013]. We give a general algorithm for computing approximate
minimax equilibria in zero-sum games where the maximizing player’s best response problem is a monotone
submodular function. Our algorithm obtains a (1 − 1e )2−approximation (modulo an additive loss of ) to
the maximizing player’s minimax strategy. This algorithm runs in pseudopolynomial time even when both
action spaces are exponentially large given access to a weakened form of a best response oracle for the
adversary. Pseudopolynomial means that the runtime bound depends polynomially on largest value of any
single item (which we expect to be a constant for most cases of interest). Our algorithm approximately solves
a non-convex, non-smooth continuous extension of the problem and then rounds the solution back to a pure
strategy in a randomized fashion. To our knowledge, no subexponential algorithm was previously known
for this problem with exponentially large strategy spaces. Our framework has a wide range of applications,
corresponding to the ubiquitous presence of submodular functions in artificial intelligence and algorithm
design (see Krause and Golovin [2014] for a survey).
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One prominent class of applications is robust submodular optimization. A decision maker is faced with
a set of submodular objectives f1...fm. They do not know which objective is the true one, and so would
like to find a decision maximizing mini fi. Robust submodular optimization has many applications because
uncertainty is so often present in decision-making. We start by studying the randomized version of this
problem, where the decision maker may select a distribution over actions such that the worst case expected
performance is maximized [Krause et al., 2011, Chen et al., 2017, Wilder et al., 2017]. This is equivalent
to computing the minimax equilibrium for a game where one player has a submodular best response. Our
techniques for solving such games also yield an algorithm for the deterministic robust optimization problem,
where the decision maker must commit to a single action. Specifically, we obtain bicriteria approximation
guarantees analogous to previous work [Krause et al., 2008] under significantly more general conditions.
We make three contributions. First, we define the class of submodular best response (SBR) games, which
includes the above examples. Second, we introduce the EQUATOR algorithm to compute approximate
equilibrium strategies for the maximizing player. Third, we give example applications of our framework
to problems with no previously known approximation algorithms. We start out by showing that network
security games [Tsai et al., 2010] can be approximately solved using EQUATOR. We then introduce and
solve the robust version of a classical submodular optimization problem: robust maximization of a coverage
function (which includes well-known applications such as budget allocation and sensor placement). Finally,
we experimentally validate our approach for network security games and robust budget allocation. We find
that EQUATOR produces near-optimal solutions and easily scales to instances that are too large for previous
algorithms to handle.
Problem description
Formulation: Let X be a set of items with |X| = n. A function f : 2X → R is submodular if for any
A ⊆ B and i ∈ X \ B, f(A ∪ {i}) − f(A) ≥ f(B ∪ {i}) − f(B). We restrict our attention to functions
that are monotone, i.e., f(A ∪ {i})− f(A) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ X,A ⊂ X. Without loss of generality, we assume
that f(∅) = 0 and hence f(S) ≥ 0 ∀S. Let F = {f1...fm} be a finite set of submodular functions on the
ground set X. m may be exponentially large. Let ∆(S) denote the set of probability distributions over the
elements of any set S. Oftentimes, we will work with independent distributions over X, which can be fully
specified by a vector x ∈ Rn+. xi gives the marginal probability that item i is chosen. Denote by pIx the
independent distribution with marginals x. Let I be a collection of subsets of X. For instance, we could have
I = {S ⊆ X : |S| ≤ k}. We would like to find a minimax equilibrium of the game where the maximizing
player’s pure strategies are the subsets in I, and the minimizing player’s pure strategies are the functions
in F . The payoff to the strategies S ∈ I and fi ∈ F is fi(S). We call a game in this form a submodular
best response (SBR) game. For the maximizing player, computing the minimax equilibrium is equivalent to
solving
max
p∈∆(I)
min
f∈F
E
S∼p
[f(S)] (1)
where S ∼ p denotes that S is distributed according to p.
Example: network security games. To make the setting more concrete, we now introduce one of our
example domains, the network security game of Tsai et al. [2010]. There is a graph G = (V,E). There is a
source vertex s (which may be a supersource connected to multiple real sources) and a set of targets T . An
attacker wishes to traverse the network starting from the source and attack a target. Each target tj has a
value τj . The attacker picks a s− tj path for some tj ∈ T . The defender attempts to catch the attacker by
protecting edges of the network. The defender may select any k edges, and the attacker is caught if any of
these edges lies on the chosen path. We use the normalized utilities defined by Jain et al. [2013], which give
the defender utility τj > 0 if an attack on tj is intercepted and 0 if the attack succeeds. Thus, each path
P from s to tj for the attacker induces an objective function fP for the defender: for any set of edges S,
fP (S) = τj if S ∩ P 6= ∅, otherwise fP (S) = 0. fP is easily seen to be submodular [Jain et al., 2013]. Hence,
we have a SBR game with I = {S ⊆ E : |S| ≤ k} and F = {fP : P is a path from S to T}.
Allowable pure strategy sets: Our running example is when the pure strategies I of the maximizing
player are all size k subsets: I = {S ⊆ X : |S| ≤ k}. In general, our algorithm works when I is any matroid;
this example is called the uniform matroid. We refer to [Korte et al., 2012] for more details on matroids.
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Here, we just note that matroids are a class of well-behaved constraint structures which are of great interest
in combinatorial optimization. A useful fact is that any linear objective can be exactly optimized over a
matroid by the greedy algorithm. For instance, consider the above uniform matroid. If each element j has a
weight wj , the highest weighted set of size k is obtained simply by taking the k items with highest individual
weights. Let k = maxS∈I |S| be the size of the largest pure strategy. E.g., in network security games k is the
number of defender resources. In general, k is the rank of the matroid.
We now introduce some notation for the continuous extension of the problem. Let 1S be the indicator
vector of the set S (i.e., an n-dimensional vector with 1 in the entries of elements that are in S and 0
elsewhere). Let P be the convex hull of {1S : S ∈ I}. Note that P is a polytope.
Best response oracles: A best response oracle for one player is a subroutine which computes the pure
strategy with highest expected utility against a mixed strategy for the other player. We assume that an
oracle is available for the minimzing player. However, we require only a weaker oracle, which we call an best
response to independent distributions oracle (BRI). A BRI oracle is only required to compute a best response
to mixed strategies which are independent distributions, represented as the marginal probability that each
item in X appears. Given a vector x ∈ Rn+, where xi is the probability that element i ∈ X is chosen, a BRI
oracle computes arg minfi∈F ES∼pIx [fi(S)]. We use S ∼ x to denote that S is drawn from the independent
distribution with marginals x. As we will see later, sometimes a BRI oracle is readily available even when
the full best response is NP-hard.
Robust optimization setting: One prominent application of SBR games is robust submodular opti-
mization. Robust optimization models decision making under uncertainty by specifying that the objective
is not known exactly. Instead, it lies within an uncertainty set U which represents the possibilities that are
consistent with our prior information. Our aim is to perform well in the worst case over all objectives in
U . We can view this as a zero sum game, where the decision maker chooses a distribution over actions and
nature adversarially chooses the true objective from U . A great deal of recent work has been devoted to the
setting of randomized actions, both because randomization can improve worst-case expected utility [Delage
et al., 2016], and because the randomized version often has much better computational properties [Krause
et al., 2011, Orlin et al., 2016]. Randomized decisions also naturally fit a problem setting where the decision
maker will take several actions and wants to maximize their total reward. Any single action might perform
badly in the worst case; drawing the actions from a distribution allows the decision maker to hedge their
bets and perform better overall.
Previous work
We discuss related work in two areas. First, solving zero-sum games with exponentially large strategy sets.
Efficient algorithms are known only for limited special cases. One approach is to represent the strategies in
a lower dimensional space (the space of marginals). We elaborate more below since our algorithm uses this
approach. For now, we just note that previous work [Ahmadinejad et al., 2016, Xu, 2016, Chan et al., 2016]
requires that the payoffs be linear in the lower dimensional space. Linearity is a very restrictive assumption;
ours is the first algorithm which extends the marginal-based approach to general submodular functions. This
requires entirely different techniques.
In practice, large zero sum games are often solved via the double oracle algorithm [McMahan et al., 2003,
Bosansky et al., 2014, Bosansky` et al., 2015, Halvorson et al., 2009]. Double oracle starts with each player
restricted to only a small number of arbitrarily chosen pure strategies and repeatedly adds a new strategy for
each player until an equilibrium is reached. The new strategies are chosen to be each player’s best response
to the other’s current mixed strategy. This technique is appealing when equilibria have sparse support, and
so only a few iterations are needed. However, it is easy to give examples where every pure strategy lies in
the support of the equilibrium, so double oracle will require exponential runtime. Our algorithm runs in
guaranteed polynomial time.
Second, we give more background on robust submodular optimization. Krause et al. [2008] introduced
the problem of maximizing the minimum of submodular functions, which corresponds to Problem 1 with
the maximizing player restricted to pure strategies. They show that the problem is inapproximable unless
P = NP. They then relax the problem by allowing the algorithm to exceed the budget constraint (a bicri-
teria guarantee). Our primary focus is on the randomized setting, where the algorithm respects the budget
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constraint but chooses a distribution over actions instead of a pure strategy. This randomized variant was
studied by Wilder et al. [2017] for the special case of influence maximization. Krause et al. [2011] and Chen
et al. [2017] studied general submodular functions using very similar techniques: both iterate dynamics where
the adversary plays a no-regret learning algorithm and the decision maker plays a greedy best response. This
algorithm maintains a variable for every function in F and so is only computationally tractable when F is
small. By contrast, we deal with the setting where F is exponentially large. However, we lose an extra factor
of (1− 1/e) in the approximation ratio.
We also extend our algorithm to obtain bicriteria guarantees for the deterministic robust submodular
optimization problem (where we select a single feasible set). Our guarantees apply under significantly more
general conditions than those of Krause et al. [2008] but have weaker approximation guarantee; details can
be found in the discussion after Theorem 4.
Preliminaries
We now introduce techniques our algorithm builds on.
Multilinear extension: We can view a set function f as being defined on the vertices of the hypercube
{0, 1}n. Each vertex is the indicator vector of a set. A useful paradigm for submodular optimization is to
extend f to a continuous function over [0, 1]n which agrees with f at the vertices. The multilinear extension
F is defined as
F (x) =
∑
S⊆X
f(S)
∏
j∈S
xj
∏
j 6∈S
1− xj .
Equivalently, F (x) = ES∼x[f(S)]. That is, F (x) is the expected value of f on sets drawn from the inde-
pendent distribution with marginals x. F can be evaluated using random sampling [Calinescu et al., 2011]
or in closed form for special cases [Iyer et al., 2014]. Note that for any set S and its indicator vector 1S ,
F (1S) = f(S). One crucial property of F is up-concavity [Calinescu et al., 2011]. That is, F is concave along
any direction u  0 (where  denotes element-wise comparison). Formally, a function F is up-concave if for
any x and any u  0, F (x + ξu) is concave as a function of ξ.
Correlation gap: A useful property of submodular functions is that little is lost by optimizing only over
independent distributions. Agrawal et al. [2010] introduced the concept of the correlation gap, which is the
maximum ratio between the expectation of a function over an independent distribution and its expectation
over a (potentially correlated) distribution with the same marginals. Let D(x) be the set of distributions
with marginals x. The correlation gap κ(f) of a function f is defined as
κ(f) = max
x∈[0,1]n
max
p∈D(x)
ES∼p[f(S)]
ES∼pIx [f(S)]
.
For any submodular function κ ≤ ee−1 . This says that, up to a loss of a factor 1 − 1/e, we can restrict
ourselves to independent distributions when solving Problem 1.
Swap rounding: Swap rounding is an algorithm developed by Chekuri et al. [2010] to round a fractional
point in a matroid polytope to an integral point. We will use swap rounding to convert the fractional point
obtained from the continuous optimization problem to a distribution over pure strategies. Swap rounding
takes as input a representation of a point x ∈ P as a convex combination of pure strategies. It then merges
these sets together in a randomized fashion until only one remains. For any submodular function f and its
multilinear extension F , the random set R satisfies E[f(R)] ≥ F (x). I.e., swap rounding only increases the
value of any submodular function in expectation.
Algorithm for SBR games
In this section, we introduce the EQUATOR (EQUilibrium via stochAsTic frank-wOlfe and Rounding) algo-
rithm for computing approximate equilibrium strategies for the maximizing player in SBR games. Since the
pure strategy sets can be exponentially large, it is unclear what it even means to compute an equilibrium:
4
representing a mixed strategy may require exponential space. Our solution to this dilemma is to show how
to efficiently sample pure strategies from an approximate equilibrium mixed strategy. This suffices for the
maximizing player to implement their strategy. Alternatively, we can build an approximate mixed strategy
with sparse support by drawing a polynomial number of samples and outputing the uniform distribution over
the samples. In order to generate these samples, EQUATOR first solves a continuous optimization problem,
which we now describe.
The marginal space: A common meta-strategy for solving games with exponentially large strategy sets
is to work in the lower-dimensional space of marginals. I.e., we keep track of only the marginal probability
that each element in the ground set is chosen. To illustrate this, let p be a distribution over the pure
strategies I, and x ∈ P denote a vector giving the marginal probability of selecting each element of X in
a set drawn according to p. Note that x is n-dimensional while p could have dimension up to 2n. Previous
work has used marginals for linear objectives. A linear function with weights w satisfies ES∼p
[∑
j∈S wj
]
=∑n
j=1 wjPr[j ∈ S] =
∑n
j=1 wjxj , so keeping track of only the marginal probabilities x is sufficient for exact
optimization. However, submodular functions do not in general satisfy this property: the utilities will depend
on the full distribution p, not just the marginals x. We will treat a given marginal vector x as representing
an independent distribution where each j is present with probability xj (i.e., x compactly represents the full
distribution pIx). The expected value of x under any submodular function is exactly given by its multilinear
extension, which is a continuous function.
Continuous extension: Let G = mini Fi be the pointwise minimum of the multilinear extensions of the
functions in F . Note that for any marginal x, G(x) is exactly the objective value of pIx for Problem 1. Hence,
optimizing G over all x ∈ P is equivalent to solving Problem 1 restricted to independent distributions. Via
the correlation gap, this restriction only loses a factor (1 − 1/e): if the optimal full distribution is pOPT ,
then the independent distribution with the same marginals as pOPT has at least (1 − 1/e) of of pOPT ’s
value under any submodular function. Previous algorithms [Calinescu et al., 2011, Bian et al., 2017] for
optimizing up-concave functions like G do not apply because G is nonsmooth (see below). We introduce a
novel Stochastic Frank-Wolfe algorithm which smooths the objective with random noise. Its runtime does
not depend directly on |F| at all; it only uses BRI calls.
Rounding: Once we have solved the continuous problem, we need a way of mapping the resulting
marginal vector x to a distribution over the pure strategies I. Notice that if we simply sample items inde-
pendently according to x, we might end up with an invalid set. For instance, in the uniform matroid which
requires |S| ≤ k, an independent draw could result in more than k items even if ∑i xi ≤ k. Hence, we sample
pure strategies by running the swap rounding algorithm on x. In order to implement the maximizing player’s
equilibrium strategy, it suffices to simply draw a sample whenever a decision is required. If a full description
of the mixed strategy is desired, we show that it is sufficient to draw Θ
(
1
2 (log |F|+ log 1δ )
)
independent
samples via swap rounding and return the uniform distribution over the sampled pure strategies.
To sum up, our strategy is as follows. First, solve the continuous optimization problem to obtain marginal
vector x. Second, draw sampled pure strategies by running randomized swap rounding on x.
Solving the continuous problem
The linchpin of our algorithmic strategy is solving the optimization problem maxx∈P G(x). In this section,
we provide the ingredients to do so.
Properties of G: We set the stage with four important properties of G (proofs are given in the supple-
ment). First, while G is not in general concave, it is up-concave:
Lemma 1. If F1...Fm are up-concave functions, then G = mini Fi is up-concave as well.
The proof is similar to the proof that the minimum of concave functions is concave. Up-concavity of G
is the crucial property that enables efficient optimization.
Second, G is Lipschitz. Specifically, let M = maxi,j fi({j}) be the maximum value of any single item. It
can be shown that ||∇Fi||∞ ≤M ∀i since (intuitively), the gradient of Fi is related to the marginal gain of
items under fi. From this we derive
Lemma 2. G is M -Lipschitz in the `1 norm.
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Algorithm 1 EQUATOR(BRI, FO,LO, u, c,K, r)
1: x0 ← u1
2: //Stochastic Frank-Wolfe algorithm
3: for ` = 1...K do
4: for t = 1...c do
5: Draw z ∼ µ(u)
6: Ft ← BRI(x`−1 + z)
7: ∇˜`t ← FO(Ft,x`−1 + z)
8: end for
9: ∇˜` ← 1c
∑c
t=1 ∇˜`t
10: v` ← LO(∇˜`)
11: x` ← x`−1 + 1Kv`
12: end for
13: xfinal ← xK − u1
14: //Sample from equilibrium mixed strategy
15: Return r samples of SwapRound(xfinal)
Third, G is not smooth. For instance, it is not even differentiable at points where the minimizing function
is not unique. This complicates the problem of optimizing G and renders earlier algorithms inapplicable.
Fourth, at any point x where the minimizing function Fi is unique, ∇G(x) = ∇Fi(x). Hence, we can
compute ∇G(x) by calling the BRI to find Fi, and then computing ∇Fi(x). In general, ∇Fi(x) can be
computed by random sampling [Calinescu et al., 2011], and closed forms are known for particular cases [Iyer
et al., 2014].
Randomized smoothing: We will solve the continuous problem maxx∈P G(x). Known strategies for
optimizing up-concave functions [Bian et al., 2017] rely crucially on G being smooth. Specifically,∇G must be
Lipschitz continuous. Unfortunately, G is not even differentiable everywhere. Even between two points x and
y where G is differentiable, ∇G(x) and ∇G(y) can be arbitrarily far apart if arg mini Fi(x) 6= arg mini Fi(y).
No previous work addresses nonsmooth optimization of an up-concave function.
To resolve this issue, we use a carefully calibrated amount of random noise to smooth the objective. Let
µ(u) be the uniform distribution over the `∞ ball of radius u. We define the smoothed objective Gµ(x) =
Ez∼µ(u) [G(x + z)] which averages over the region around x. This (and similar) techniques have been studied
in the context of convex optimization [Duchi et al., 2012]. We show that Gµ is a good smooth approximator
of G.
Lemma 3. Gµ has the following properties:
• Gµ is up-concave.
• |Gµ(x)−G(x)| ≤ Mnu2 ∀x.
• Gµ is differentiable, with ∇Gµ(x) = E[∇G(x + z)].
• ∇Gµ is Mµ −Lipschitz continuous in the `1 norm.
Hence, we can use Gµ as a better-behaved proxy for G since it is both smooth and close to G everywhere
in the domain. The main challenge is that Gµ and its gradients are not available in closed form. Accordingly,
we randomly sample values of the perturbation z and average over the value of G (or its gradient) at these
sampled points.
Stochastic Frank-Wolfe algorithm (SFW)
We propose the SFW algorithm (Algorithm 1) to optimize Gµ. SFW generates a series of feasible points
x0...xK , where K is the number of iterations. Each point is generated from the last via two steps. First,
SFW estimates the gradient of Gµ. Second, it takes a step towards the point in P which is furthest in the
direction of the gradient. To carry out these steps, SFW requires three oracles. First, a linear optimization
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oracle LO which, given an objective w, returns arg maxv∈P w>v. In the context of our problem, LO outputs
the indicator vector of the set S ∈ I which maximizes the linear objective w. S can be efficiently found via
the greedy algorithm. The other two oracles concern gradient evaluation. One is the BRI oracle discussed
earlier. The other is a stochastic first-order oracle FO which, for any function Fi and point x, returns an
unbiased estimate of ∇Fi(x).
The algorithm starts at x0 = 0. At each iteration `, it averages over c calls to FO to compute a stochastic
approximation ∇˜` to ∇Gµ(x`−1) (Lines 4-9). For each call, it draws a random perturbation z ∼ µ(u) and
uses the BRI to find the minimizing F at x`−1+z. It then queries FO for an estimate of∇F (x`−1+z). Lastly,
it takes a step in the direction of v` = LO(∇˜`) by setting x` = x`−1 + 1Kv` (Lines 10-11). Since x` at each
iteration is a combination of vertices of P, the output is guaranteed to be feasible. The intuition for why the
algorithm succeeds is that it only moves along nonnegative directions (since v` is always nonnegative). This
is in contrast to gradient-based algorithms for concave optimization, which move in the (possibly negative)
direction v`−x`. As an up-concave function, Gµ is concave along all nonegative directions. By moving only
in such directions we inherit enough of the nice properties of concave optimization to obtain a (1 − 1/e)−
approximation.
A small technical detail is that adding random noise z could result in negative values, for which the
multilinear extension is not defined. To circumvent this, we start the algorithm at x0 = u1 (i.e., with small
positive values in every entry) and then return xfinal = x
K − u1 (Line 13).
Theoretical bounds
Let T1 be the runtime of the linear optimization oracle and T2 be the runtime of the first-order oracle. We
prove the following guarantee for SFW:
Theorem 1. For any , δ > 0, there are parameter settings such that SFW finds a solution xK satisfying
G(xK) ≥ (1− 1e )OPT −  with probability at least 1− δ. Its runtime is O˜
(
T1
M2k2n
2 + T2
k4M4n
4 log
1
δ
)
1.
We remark that T1 is small since linear optimization over P can be carried out by a greedy algorithm.
For instance, the runtime is T1 = O (n log n) for the uniform matroid, which covers many applications. T2 is
typically dominated by the runtime of the BRI since it is known how to efficiently compute the gradient of
a submodular function [Calinescu et al., 2011, Iyer et al., 2014].
Based on this result, we show the following guarantee on a single randomly sampled set that EQUATOR
returns after applying swap rounding to the marginal vector xfinal.
Theorem 2. With r = 1, EQUATOR outputs a set S ∈ I such that mini E[fi(S)] ≥ (1− 1e )2OPT −  with
probability at least 1− δ. Its time complexity is the same as SFW.
Proof. Suppose that pOPT is the distribution achieving the optimal value for Problem 1. Let x
∗ be the
optimizer for the problem maxx∈P G(x). That is, x∗ can be interpreted as the marginals of the independent
distribution which maximizes mini ES∼pI
x∗
[fi(S)]. With slight abuse of notation, let p
I
OPT be the independent
distribution with the same marginals as pOPT . By applying the correlation gap to each fi ∈ F and taking
the min, we have
min
fi∈F
E
S∼pOPT
[fi(S)] ≤ e
e− 1 minfi∈F ES∼pIOPT
[fi(S)].
By definition of x∗, G(x∗) ≥ minfi∈F ES∼pIOPT [fi(S)]. Hence, G(x∗) ≥ (1 − 1/e) mini ES∼pIx∗ [fi(S)] =
(1−1/e)OPT . Via Theorem 1, the marginal vector x that our algorithm finds satisfies G(x) ≥ (1− 1e )G(x∗)−
 ≥ (1− 1e )2OPT − . Lastly, Chekuri et al. [2010] show that swap rounding outputs an independent set S
satisfying E[fi(S)] ≥ Fi(S) for any fi ∈ F , which completes the proof.
This guarantee is sufficient if we just want to implement the maximizing player’s strategy by sampling an
action. We also prove that if a full description of the maximizing player’s mixed strategy is desired, drawing
a small number of independent samples via swap rounding suffices:
1The O˜ notation hides logarithmic terms
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Algorithm 2 Efficient bicriteria approximation
1: Run EQUATOR to obtain xfinal.
2: for j = 1...e log 1δ do
3: run SwapRound(xfinal)
8 log |F|
3 + 1 times, yielding S
j
1...S
j
r .
4: Sj ← Sj1 ∪ Sj2 ∪ .... ∪ Sjr
5: end for
6: return arg maxSj minfi∈F fi(Sj)
Theorem 3. Draw r = O ( 13 (log |F|+ log 1δ )) samples using independent runs of randomized swap round-
ing. The uniform distribution on these samples is a (1 − 1e )2 −  approximate equilibrium strategy for the
maximizing player with probability at least 1− δ. The runtime is O
(
rk2M2n

)
.
This also gives a simple way of obtaining a single feasible set (pure strategy) which has a bicriteria
guarantee for the robust optimization problem. As pointed out by Chen et al. [2017], since the fi are all
monotone, taking the union of the sets output by swap rounding gives a single set with at least as much
value. Algorithm 2 implements this procedure. It first solves the fractional problem by running EQUATOR.
Then, it carries out a series of independent iterations. Each iteration j draws 8 log |F|3 sets via swap rounding
and stores their union Sj . It then returns the best of the Sj . Via our concentration bound for the distribution
produced in each iteration (Theorem 3), each iteration succeeds in producing a “good” set with probability
at least 1e . Algorithm 2 runs e log
1
δ iterations so that at least one succeeds with probability at least 1− δ.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 2 returns a single set S which is the union of at most 8 log |F|3 + 1 elements of I and
satisfies minfi∈F fi(S) ≥
(
1− 1e
)2
maxS∗∈I minfi∈F fi(S
∗)−  with probability at least 1− δ.
The strongest existing bicriteria guarantee is for the SATURATE algorithm of Krause et al. [2008],
which outputs a set matching the optimal value with size
(
log
(
maxv∈X
∑
fi∈F fi({v})
)
+ 1
)
k. Our S
maintains logarithmic dependence on |F|, but also contains dependence on . Moreoever, it is only a (1− 1e )2-
approximation to the optimal solution quality. However, our result is much more general than that of Krause
et al. and handles situations that SATURATE cannot. First, our result applies when F is accessible only
through an oracle, where SATURATE relies on explicitly enumerating the functions. Second, our result
applies when I is any matroid, where SATURATE applies only to cardinality-constrained problems. To our
knowledge, this is the first computationally efficient bicriteria algorithm under either condition.
Improving the approximation ratio
In this section, we examine the conditions under which it is possible to improve EQUATOR’s
(
1− 1e
)2
-
approximation to
(
1− 1e
)
. The earlier analysis lost a factor
(
1− 1e
)
in two places: the use of the correlation
gap to bound the loss introduced by only tracking marginals, and the use of SFW to solve the continuous
relaxation. While the second factor is difficult to improve, we can eliminate the loss from the correlation gap
when a stronger best response oracle for the adversary is available. Specifically, we define a best response
to mixture of independent distributions (BRMI) oracle to be an algorithm which, given a list of marginal
vectors x1...xρ, outputs
arg min
fi∈F
1
ρ
ρ∑
j=1
Fi(x
j).
We will be interested in BRMI oracles which take time polynomial in ρ. As the name implies, a BRMI
oracle can compute adversary best responses to any distribution which is explicitly represented as a mixture
of independent distributions with given marginals. By contrast, a BRI is restricted to a single independent
distribution. A BRMI is a considerably more powerful oracle because, with sufficiently large ρ, any distribu-
tion can be arbitrarily well-approximated by a mixture of independent distributions (a statement which is
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Algorithm 3 EQUATOR with improved approximation guarantee
1: Set ρ = O
(
W 2 log |F|
2
)
2: Use SFW to solve the problem maxx1..xρ∈×ρj=1P minfi∈F
1
ρ
∑ρ
j=1 Fi(x
j), obtaining x1..xρ
3: Set r = O
(
1
3 log
(
|F|ρ
δ
))
4: for i = 1...ρ do
5: Draw sets Si1...S
i
r independently as SwapRound(x
i).
6: end for
7: Return the uniform distribution on {Sij : i = 1...ρ, j = 1...r}.
formalized below). Hence, the algorithm we propose maintains ρ copies of the decision variables x1...xρ for
a value of ρ which will be set later. We aim to maximize
max
x1..xρ∈×ρj=1P
min
fi∈F
1
ρ
ρ∑
j=1
E
S∼xj
[fi(S)]
which we recognize as being equivalent to the problem
max
x1..xρ∈×ρj=1P
min
fi∈F
1
ρ
ρ∑
j=1
Fi(x
j) (2)
It is easy to check that 1ρ
∑ρ
j=1 Fi(x
j) is an up-concave function which inherits all of the smoothness
properties of the Fi. Hence, we can use SFW to obtain a
(
1− 1e
)
-approximate solution to Problem 2 provided
that we have a BRMI oracle with which to compute gradients. After solving Problem 2, we can use swap
rounding to produce feasible sets with guaranteed approximation ratio. For a single set, we first select a
j ∈ {1...ρ} uniformly at random and then run swap rounding on xj . To output a full distribution, as in
Theorem 3, we draw r = O
(
1
3 log
(
|F|ρ
δ
))
samples from each of the xj and then output the uniform
distribution over the combined set of samples. The extra logarithmic dependence on ρ ensures that we
can take a final union bound over the ρ batches of swap rounding. The entire procedure is summarized in
Algorithm 3. We let W be an upper bound on the value of f for any feasible set: W ≥ maxfi∈F,S∈I fi(S).
Note that W ≤ nM always holds via submodularity, but tighter bounds might apply for particular functions.
We have the following approximation guarantee for Algorithm 3. We note that the idea of optimizing
over a mixture of independent distributions has been used in [Dughmi and Xu, 2017], but we prove Lemma
4 (establishing that a good mixture exists) for completeness.
Theorem 5. Given access to a BRMI oracle for any SBR game instance, Algorithm 3 returns a distribution
p which satisfies minfi∈F ES∼p [fi(S)] ≥
(
1− 1
)
OPT −  with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof. We first establish that there exists a near-optimal distribution over elements of I with support size
at most O
(
W 2 log |F|
2
)
:
Lemma 4. Take any collection of functions F with maxfi∈F,S∈I fi(S) ≤ W and a distribution p ∈
∆(I). There exists a distribution q supported on at most ρ = O
(
W 2 log |F|
2
)
elements of I which satisfies
ES∼q[fi(S)] ≥ ES∼p[fi(S)]−  for all fi ∈ F .
Proof. We will use the probabilistic method. Suppose that we draw ρ = W
2 log |F|
2 samples S1...Sρ inde-
pendently from p and let q be the uniform distribution on the samples. Fix an arbitrary function fi. Via
Hoeffding’s inequality, we have that
9
Pr
[
E
S∼p
[fi(S)]− 1
r
r∑
i=1
fi(S) ≥ 
]
≤ e− 2r
2
W2 ≤ 1|F|2
and this holds simultaneously for all scenarios y with probability at least 1 − 1|F| > 0 via union bound.
That is, we have a random sampling procedure which outputs a distribution q satisfying ES∼q[fi(S)] ≥
ES∼p[fi(S)]−  for all fi ∈ F with positive probability. Via the probabilistic method we are guaranteed that
such a distribution (i.e., one which is a uniform distribution on at most ρ elements of I) exists.
Now, note that Algorithm 3 maximizes over the set ×ρj=1P, which includes the distribution q. Via the
guarantee for SFW (Theorem 1), SFW returns x1...xρ satisfying minfi∈F
1
ρ
∑ρ
j=1 Fi(x
j) ≥ (1− 1e)OPT − 
(we ignore for convenience the issue of adjusting all of the  values by a constant factor). Now we just need
to establish that the rounding procedure succeeds. A simple variation on the proof of Theorem 3 suffices:
we claim that 1r
∑r
a=1 fi(S
a
j ) ≥ ES∼xj [fi(S)]−  holds for each i, j with probability at least 1− δρ|F| via our
choice of r. Taking union bound over all i = 1...|F| and j = 1...r completes the proof.
Applications
We now give several examples of domains that our algorithm can be applied to. In each of these cases, we
obtain the first guaranteed polynomial time constant-factor approximation algorithm for the problem. The
key part of both applications is developing a BRI (the first order oracle is easily obtained in closed form via
straightforward calculus).
Network security games: Earlier, we formulated network security games in the SBR framework. All
we need to solve it using EQUATOR is a BRI oracle. The full attacker best response problem is known to be
NP-hard [Jain et al., 2011]. However, it turns out the best response to an independent distribution is easily
computed. Index the set of paths and let Pi be the ith path, ending at a target with value τi. Let P (tj) be
the set of all paths from the (super)source s to tj . Let fi be the corresponding submodular objective. Given
a defender mixed strategy x, the attacker best response problem is to find mini ES∼x[fi(S)]. We can rewrite
this as
min
i
E
S∼x
[fi(S)] = min
i
E
S∼x
[τi1[S ∩ Pi 6= ∅]]
= min
tj∈T
τj min
P∈P (tj)
E
S∼x
[1[S ∩ P 6= ∅]]
= min
tj∈T
τj min
P∈P (tj)
1−
∏
e∈P
[1− xe]
We can now solve a separate problem for each target tj and then take the one with lowest value. For
each tj , we solve a shortest path problem. We aim to find a s− tj path which maximizes the product of the
the weights 1 − xe on each edge. Taking logarithms, this is equivalent to finding the path which minimizes
−∑e∈P log(1 − xe) = ∑e∈P log 11−xe . This is a shortest path problem in which each edge has nonnegative
weight log 11−xe , and so can be solved via Dijkstra’s algorithm. With the attacker BRI in hand, applying
EQUATOR yields the first subexponential-time algorithm for network security games.
Robust coverage and budget allocation: Many widespread applications of submodular functions
concern coverage functions. A coverage function takes the following form. There a set of items U , and each
j ∈ U has a weight wj . The algorithm can choose from a ground set X = {a1...an} of actions. Each action ai
covers a set Ai ⊆ U . The value of any set of actions is the total value of the items that those actions cover:
f(S) =
∑
j∈⋃i∈S Ai wj . We can also consider probabilistic extensions where action ai covers each j ∈ Ai
independently with probability pij . This framework includes budget allocation, sensor placement, facility
location, and many other common submodular optimization problems. Here we consider a robust coverage
problem where the weights w are unknown. For concreteness, we focus on the budget allocation problem,
but all of our logic applies to general coverage functions.
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Budget allocation models an advertiser’s choice of how to divide a finite budget B between a set of
advertising channels. Each channel is a vertex on the left hand side L of a bipartite graph. The right hand
R consists of customers. Each customer v ∈ R has a value wv which is the advertiser’s expected profit from
reaching v. The advertiser allocates their budget in integer amounts among L. Let y(s) denote the amount
of budget allocated to channel s ∈ L. The advertiser solves the problem
max
y:||y||1≤B
fw(y) =
∑
v∈R
wv
[
1−
∏
s∈L
(1− psv)y(s)
]
where psv is the probability that one unit of advertising on channel s will reach customer v. This a
probabilistic coverage problem where the action set X contains B copies2 of each s ∈ L and the feasible
decisions I are all size B subsets of X. Choosing b copies of node s corresponds to setting y(s) = b. Budget
allocation has been the subject of a great deal of recent research [Alon et al., 2012, Soma et al., 2014,
Miyauchi et al., 2015].
In the robust optimization problem, the profits w are not exactly known. Instead, they belong to a
polyhedral uncertainty set U . This is very realistic: while an advertiser may be able to estimate the profit
for each customer from past data, they are unlikely to know the true value for any particular campaign. We
remark that Staib and Jegelka [2017] also considered a robust budget allocation problem, but their problem
has uncertainty on the probabilities pst, not the profits w. Further, they consider a continuous problem
without the complication of rounding to discrete solutions.
As an example uncertainty set, consider the D-norm uncertain set, which is common in robust optimiza-
tion [Bertsimas et al., 2004, Staib and Jegelka, 2017]. The uncertainty set is defined around a point estimate
wˆ as
U wˆγ = {w : ∃c ∈ [0, 1]|R|, wi = (1− ci)wˆi, ||c||1 ≤ γ}.
This can be thought of as allowing an adversary to scale down each entry of wˆ with a total budget
of γ. In our case, wˆ is the advertiser’s best estimate from past data, and they would like to perform well
for all scenarios within U wˆγ . γ defines the advertiser’s tolerance for risk. The problem we want to solve is
maxp∈∆(I) minw∈Uwˆγ Ey∼p[fw(y)], which we recognize as an instance of Problem 1. For any fixed distribution
p, we have by linearity of expectation
E
y∼p[fw(y)] =
∑
v∈R
wv E
y∼p
[
1−
∏
s∈L
(1− psv)y(s)
]
.
Note that the inner expectation (which is the total probability that each v ∈ R is reached) is constant
with respect to w. Hence, the adversary’s best response problem of computing minw∈U Ey∼p[fw(y)] is a
linear program and can be easily solved. The coefficients of this LP (the inner expectation in the above
sum) can easily be computed exactly for any independent distribution. Further, since any LP has an optimal
solution among the vertices of U wˆγ , we can without loss of generality restrict the adversary’s pure strategies
to a finite (though exponentially large) number.
Lastly, we remark that it also possible to obtain a BRMI for this problem. For any distribution p, we
can find a best response via linear programming provided that the coefficients Ey∼p
[
1−∏s∈L(1− psv)y(s)]
can be computed for each v ∈ R. This is easy when p is given explicitly as a mixture of independent
distributions x1...xρ since we just average over the corresponding term for each individual xi. Hence, we can
use Algorithm 3 to obtain a
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation. Nevertheless, we use the original EQUATOR algorithm
in our experiments and find that it performs near-optimally despite its theoretically weaker approximation
ratio.
2We use this formulation for simplicity, but it is possible to use only logB copies of each node [Ene and Nguyen, 2016].
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Figure 1: Experimental results for network security games.
Experiments
We now show experimental results from applying EQUATOR to these two domains.
Network security games: We first study the network security game defined above. We compare EQUA-
TOR to the SNARES algorithm [Jain et al., 2013] which is the current state of the art algorithm with guar-
anteed solution quality. SNARES uses a double oracle approach to find a globally optimal solution. However,
it incorporates several domain-specific heuristics which substantially improve its runtime over a standard
implementation of double oracle. We note that Iwashita et al. [2016] proposed a newer double-oracle style
algorithm which first preprocesses the graph to remove unnecessary edges. We do not compare to this ap-
proach because the preprocessing step can be applied equally well to either EQUATOR or double oracle. We
use random geometric graphs, which are commonly used to assess algorithms for this domain due to their
similarity to real world road networks [Jain et al., 2013, Iwashita et al., 2016]. As in Jain et al. [2013], we
use density d = 0.1 with the value of each target drawn uniformly at random in [0, 100]. We set k to be one
percent of the number of edges. Each data point averages over 30 random instances. EQUATOR was run
with K = 100, c = 60, u = 0.1.
Figure 1 shows the results. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) vary the network size n with three randomly chosen
source and target nodes. Figure 1(a) plots utility (i.e., how much loss is averted by the defender’s allocation)
as a function of n. Error bars show one standard deviation. We see that EQUATOR obtains utility within
6% of SNARES, which computes a global optimum. Figure 1(b) shows runtime (on a logarithmic scale)
as a function of n. SNARES was terminated after 10 hours for graphs with 250 nodes, while EQUATOR
easily scales to 1000 nodes. Next, Figures 1(c) and 1(d) show results as the number of sources and targets
grows. As expected, utility decreases with more sources/targets since the number of resources is constant
and it becomes harder to defend the network. EQUATOR obtains utility within 4% of SNARES. However,
SNARES was terminated after 10 hours for just 5 source/targets, while EQUATOR runs in under 25 seconds
with 20 source/targets.
Robust budget allocation: We compare three algorithms for robust budget allocation. First, EQUA-
TOR. Second, double oracle. We use the greedy algorithm for the defender’s best response (which is a
(1− 1/e)-approximation) since the exact best response is intractable. For the adversary’s best response, we
use the linear program discussed in the section on robust coverage. Third, we compare to “greedy”, which
greedily optimizes the advertiser’s return under the point estimate wˆ. Greedy was implemented with lazy
evaluation [Minoux, 1978] which greatly improves its runtime at no cost to solution value. We generated
random bipartite graphs with |L| = |R| = n where each potential edge is present with probability 0.2 and for
each edge (u, v), pu,v is draw uniformly in [0, 0.2]. wˆ was randomly generated with each coordinate uniform
in [0.5, 1.5]. Our uncertainty set is the D-norm set around wˆ with γ = 12n, representing a substantial degree
of uncertainty. The budget was B = 5 + 0.01 · n since the problem is hardest when B is small relative to n.
EQUATOR was run with K = 20, c = 10, u = 0.1.
Figure 2 shows the results. Each point averages over 30 random problem instances (error bars would
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Figure 2: Experimental results for budget allocation.
be hidden under the markers). Figure 2(a) plots the profit obtained by each algorithm when the true w is
chosen as the worst case in U wˆγ , with n increasing on the x axis. Figure 2(b) plots the average runtime for
each n. We see that double oracle produces highly robust solutions. However, for even n = 500, its execution
was halted after 10 hours. Greedy is highly scalable, but produces solutions that are approximately 40% less
robust than double oracle. EQUATOR produces solution quality within 7% of double oracle and runs in less
than 30 seconds with n = 1000.
Next, we show results on a real world dataset from Yahoo webscope [Yahoo, 2007]. The dataset logs
bids placed by advertisers on a set of phrases. We create a budget allocation problem where the phrases are
advertising channels and the accounts are targets; the resulting problem has |L| = 1000 and |R| = 10, 394.
Other parameters are the same as before. We obtain instances of varying size by randomly sampling a subset
of L. Figures 2(c-d) show results (averaging over 30 random instances). In Figure 2(c), we see that both
double oracle and EQUATOR find highly robust solutions, with EQUATOR’s solution value within 8% of
that of double oracle. By contrast, greedy obtains no profit in the worst case for |L| > 20, validating the
importance of robust solutions on real problems. In Figure 2(d), we observe that double oracle was terminated
after 10 hours for n = 500 while EQUATOR scales to n = 1000 in under 40 seconds. Hence, EQUATOR is
empirically successful at finding highly robust solutions in an efficient manner, complementing its theoretical
guarantees.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper introduces the class of submodular best response games, capturing the zero sum interaction
between two players when one has a submodular best response problem. Examples include network security
games and robust submodular optimization problems. We study the case where the set of possible objective
functions is very large (exponential in the problem size), arising from an underlying combinatorial structure.
Our main result is a pseudopolynomial time algorithm to compute an approximate minimax equilibrium
strategy for the maximizing player when the set of submodular objectives admits a certain form of best
response oracle. We instantiate this framework for two example domains, and show experimentally that our
algorithm scales to much larger instances than previous approaches.
One interesting direction for future work is to extend this framework to new application domains. Sub-
modular structure is present in many problems, e.g., sensor placement in water networks [Krause et al.,
2008] or cyber-security monitoring [Haghtalab et al., 2015]. Both seem natural domains for future work, but
designing appropriate best response oracles may be algorithmically challenging. Another open direction is to
extend our framework to cases where only approximate best responses are available for the adversary. This
would enable applications even in settings where an exact BRI is computationally intractable.
Acknowledgments: This research was supported by a NSF Graduate Fellowship. We thank Shaddin
Dughmi for helpful conversations.
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Appendix: Omitted proofs
We start out by proving some lemmas from the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let u  0. We would like to show that for any x and any ξ ≥ 0, G(x + ξu) is concave
as a function of ξ. Fix any ξ1, ξ2 ≥ 0 and any λ ∈ [0, 1]. We have
min
i
Fi(x + (λξ1 + (1− λ)ξ2)u) ≥ min
i
[λFi(x + ξ1u) + (1− λ)Fi(x + ξ2u)]
≥ λmin
i
Fi(x + ξ1u) + (1− λ) min
i
Fi(x + ξ2u)
where the first inequality follows because each Fi is individually up-concave.
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Proof of Lemma 2. G is differentiable at a point x precisely when there is a unique Fi such that Fi(x) =
minj Fj(x). Here, we have ∇G(x) = ∇Fi(x). Note that ∂Fi∂xj
∣∣∣
x
= E[fi(R(x)|j ∈ R(x))] − E[fi(R(x)|j 6∈
R(x))] = E[fi(j|R(x− xj))]. By submodularity, we conclude that ∂Fi∂xj
∣∣∣
x
≤ fi({j}) ≤M . Further, ∂Fi∂xj
∣∣∣
x
≥ 0
always holds by monotonicity. Thus, ||∇G(x)||∞ ≤M .
Let µ be the uniform probability distribution over the `∞ ball of radius u. Define the smoothed function
Gµ(x) = Ez∼µ[G(x + z)]. We will show the following properties of Gµ:
Proof of Lemma 3. For the first property, we start out by fixing the draw of z from µ. Following the logic
of Lemma 1, we have that
min
i
Fi(x + z + (λξ1 + (1− λ)ξ2)u) ≥ min
i
λFi(x + zξ1u) + (1− λ)Fi(x + z + ξ2u)
≥ λmin
i
Fi(x + z + ξ1u) + (1− λ) min
i
Fi(x + z + ξ2u).
Since these inequalities hold for any fixed z, they also hold in expectation over a random z, so we conclude
that Gµ is up-concave.
For the second property: since ||∇G||∞ ≤ M , G is M -Lipschitz with respect to the `1 norm. Thus, we
have
E[G(x + z)] ≤ G(x) +M E[||z||1] ≤ G(x) + Mnu
2
and analogously, E[G(x + z)] ≥ G(x)− Mnu2 .
The third property follows from the fact that G is differentiable almost everywhere. To see this, note that
G is differentiable wherever there is a unique minimizing Fi, in which case ∇G = ∇Fi. Suppose that there
is not a unique minimizer at some point x. There are two cases. First, if there is an open ball around x such
that the minimizing functions at x coincide at every point in the ball, then their gradients also coincide in
the ball. Thus, G is still differentiable at x. Second, if no such open ball exists, then the set of points at
which G is not differentiable has measure zero. Hence, taking a random perturbation of the input avoids
such points with probability 1.
For the proof of the fourth property, we follow the argument of Duchi et al. (2012). We first claim that
||∇Gµ(x)−∇Gµ(y)||∞ = ||E [∇G(x + z)]− E [∇G(y + z)] ||∞ ≤M
∫
|µ(z − x)− µ(z − y)|dz. (3)
We prove this claim as follows. Without loss of generality, we take x = 0 for this step of the proof (via a
linear change of variables). Let g(x) be a function that is defined as ∇G(x) where G is differentiable. At the
(measure 0) set of points where G is not differentiable, we define g to be equal to ∇Fi(x) for an arbitrary
i ∈ arg minj Fj(x). With probability 1, E[g(x + z)] = E[∇G(x + z)] We have
E[g(z)− g(y + z)] =
∫
g(z)µ(z)dz −
∫
g(y + z)µ(z)dz
=
∫
g(z)µ(z)dz −
∫
g(z)µ(z − y)dz
=
∫
I>
g(z) [µ(z)− µ(z − y)] +
∫
I<
g(z) [µ(z − y)− µ(z)]
where I> = {z|µ(z) > µ(z − y)} and I< = {z|µ(z) < µ(z − y)}. Taking norms, we have
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||E[g(z)− g(y + z)]||∞ ≤ sup
z∈I>∪I<
||g(z)||∞
∣∣∣∣∫
I>
[µ(z)− µ(z − y)] +
∫
I<
[µ(z − y)− µ(z)]
∣∣∣∣
≤M
∣∣∣∣∫
I>
[µ(z)− µ(z − y)] +
∫
I<
[µ(z − y)− µ(z)]
∣∣∣∣
= M
∫
|µ(z)− µ(z − y)|dz
Having proved that Equation 3 holds, we now just need to show
∫ |µ(z − x) − µ(z − y)|dz ≤ ||x−y||1u .
This follows from Duchi et al. (2012), Lemma 12.
We now prove a technical smoothness lemma. The argument is standard, but we include it for complete-
ness.
Lemma 5. For any x,y, Gµ(x + γy)−Gµ(x) ≥ γ∇Gµ(x)Ty − Mk
2γ2
2u .
Proof. For any x,y ∈ P, we consider the one dimensional auxiliary function gx,y(ξ) = Gµ(x+ ξy). We have
Gµ(x + γy)−Gµ(x) =
∫ 1
ξ=0
dgx,γy(ξ)
dξ
dξ
=
∫ 1
ξ=0
∇Gµ(x + ξγy)>(γy)dξ
= γ
∫ 1
ξ=0
∇Gµ(x)>y +
[∇Gµ(x + ξγy)> −∇Gµ(x)>]ydξ
≥ γ
∫ 1
ξ=0
∇Gµ(x)>y − ||∇Gµ(x + ξγy)> −∇Gµ(x)>||∞||y||1dξ (by Ho¨lder’s inequality)
≥ γ
∫ 1
ξ=0
∇Gµ(x)>y − M
µ
||ξγy||1||y||1dξ (∇Gµ is M
µ
)-Lipschitz
≥ γ∇Gµ(x)> − γ2
∫ 1
ξ=0
Mk2
u
ξdξ (bound on `1 diameter of P)
= γ∇Gµ(x)> − γ
2Mk2
2u
which proves the lemma.
We also use the following lemma, the proof of which can be found in Bian et al. (2017):
Lemma 6. For any DR-submodular function G and its optimizer x∗, G(x∗ + x)−G(x) ≤ ∇G(x)>x∗.
We can now proceed to prove our guarantee on the performance of the SFW algorithm for optimizing
the objective G.
Proof of Theorem 1. We analyze the gain made in a single step of SFW as follows:
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Gµ(x
`)−Gµ(x`−1) ≥ γ`∇Gµ(x`−1)>v` − Mk
2
2u
γ2` (Lemma 5)
= γ`∇˜>` v` − γ`
(
∇˜` −∇Gµ(x`−1)
)>
v` − Mk
2
2u
γ2`
≥ γ`∇˜>` v` − γ`k||∇˜` −∇Gµ(x`−1)||∞ −
Mk2
2u
γ2` (by Ho¨lder’s inequality and rank(M) = k)
≥ γ`∇˜>` x∗ − γ`k||∇˜` −∇Gµ(x`−1)||∞ −
Mk2
2u
γ2` (by definition of x
∗)
= γ`∇Gµ(x`−1)>x∗ − γ`
(
Gµ(x
`−1)− ∇˜`
)>
x∗ − γ`k||∇˜` −∇Gµ(x`−1)||∞ − Mk
2
2u
γ2`
≥ γ`∇Gµ(x`−1)>x∗ − 2γ`k||∇˜` −∇Gµ(x`−1)||∞ − Mk
2
2u
γ2`
≥ γ`
(
Gµ(x
∗ + x`−1)−Gµ(x`−1)
)− 2γ`k||∇˜` −∇Gµ(x`−1)||∞ − Mk2
2u
γ2` ( Lemma 6 and x
∗  0)
≥ γ`
(
Gµ(x
∗)−Gµ(x`−1)
)− 2γ`k||∇˜` −∇Gµ(x`−1)||∞ − Mk2
2u
γ2` ( monotonicity)
Now we give a high probability bound on ||∇˜`−∇Gµ(x`−1)||∞. Denote by ∇˜i` the ith randomly sampled
gradient and
[
∇˜i`
]
j
its jth entry (the derivative with respect to item j). We will give a high probability
bound on each individual entry of the estimated gradient and them combine them using union bound to
control ||∇˜` −∇Gµ(x`−1)||∞.
Fix any individual entry j. We have
[
∇˜`
]
j
= 1c
∑c
i=1
[
∇˜i`
]
j
. Because the first-order oracle returns an
unbiased estimate, we know that E
[[
∇˜`
]
j
−∇jGµ(x`−1)
]
= 0. Further,
∣∣∣∣[∇˜`]
j
∣∣∣∣ ≤M and ∣∣∇jGµ(x`−1)∣∣ ≤
M , so
∣∣∣∣[∇˜`]
j
−∇jGµ(x`−1)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2M holds via triangle inequality. Now via Hoeffding’s inequality, we have
that
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣
c∑
i=1
[
∇˜i`
]
j
− c∇jGµ(x`−1)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ m 8k
]
≤ 2e− 
2c
128k2M2
and so taking c = 128M
2k2
2 log
4Kn
δ ensures that
Pr
[∣∣∣∣[∇˜`]
j
−∇jGµ(x`−1)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 8k
]
≤ δ
2Kn
.
By union bound, the total probability of this event holding for all n items at each of the K timesteps is
at least 1− δ2 . In all of what follows, we condition on this happening. Rearranging gives
Gµ(x
∗)−Gµ(x`) ≤ (1− γ`)
[
Gµ(x
∗)−Gµ(x`−1)
]− 2γ`k||∇˜` −∇Gµ(x`−1)||∞ − Mk2
2u
γ2`
≤ (1− γ`)
[
Gµ(x
∗)−Gµ(x`−1)
]− γ`
4
− Mk
2
2u
γ2`
and so after K iterations we obtain
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Gµ(x
∗)−Gµ(xK) ≤
K−1∏
`=0
(1− γ`)
[
Gµ(x
∗)−Gµ(x0)
]− K−1∑
`=0
γ`
4
−
K−1∑
`=0
Mk2
2u
γ2`
≤ e−
∑K−1
`=0 γ`Gµ(x
∗)−
K−1∑
`=0
γ`
4
−
K−1∑
`=0
Mk2
2u
γ2`
with constant stepsize γ = 1K , we have
∑K−1
`=0 γ` = 1 and
∑K−1
`=0 γ
2
` =
1
K , this yields
Gµ(x
∗)−Gµ(xK) ≤ 1
e
Gµ(x
∗)− 
4
− Mk
2
2uK
and hence
G(x∗)−G(xK) ≤ 1
e
Gµ(x
∗)− 
4
− Mk
2
2uK
−Mnu.
and so taking u = 4Mn and K =
8M2k2n
2 ensures that G(x
∗)−G(xK) ≤ 1eGµ(x∗)− 34
Now we just need a small trick to deal with the issue that G is only defined for x ∈ [0, 1]n, and random
perturbation by z may take us out of this range. To avoid negative values, we start the algorithm at the
point u1. Since each coordinate only increases during the course of the algorithm, we are guaranteed to
query G only at nonnegative points. To deal with values greater than 1, we can instead analyze the function
H(x) = G(x ∧ 1), where ∧ denotes coordinate-wise maximum. H is also up-concave, and agrees with G at
every point in P. After running SFW applied to H for K iterations, we obtain via Theorem 1 a solution xK
such that H(xK) ≥ (1 − 1e ) maxx∈P H(x) −  = (1 − 1e ) maxx∈P G(x) − . The issue is that we may have
xK 6∈ P. We output the point xK −u1, which is guaranteed to lie in P. To analyze the loss incurred, we use
the following lemma
Lemma 7. Let f be a monotone submodular function with maxi f({i}) ≤M . Let R(x) be a random set in
which every element appears independently with probability xi ≥ u. Then E[f(R(x − u1))] ≥ E[f(R(x))] −
uMn.
Proof. We decompose the expected value of R(x − u1) into the expected marginal contribution from each
item:
E[f(R(x− u1))] =
n∑
i=1
Pr[i ∈ f(R(x− u1))]E[f(i|(R(x− u1))] (linearity of expectation)
≥
n∑
i=1
Pr[i ∈ f(R(x− u1))]E[f(i|(R(x))] (submodularity)
=
n∑
i=1
(xi − u)E[f(i|(R(x))]
=
n∑
i=1
xi E[f(i|(R(x))]− u
n∑
i=1
E[f(i|(R(x))]
≥
n∑
i=1
xi E[f(i|(R(x))]− u
n∑
i=1
E[f({i})] (submodularity)
≥
n∑
i=1
xi E[f(i|(R(x))]− unM (f({i}) ≤M)
= E[f(R(x))]− uMn.
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Applying Lemma 7 to every fi ∈ F , we conclude that
H(xK − u1) ≥ H(xK)− uMn = G(xK)− 
4
≥
(
1− 1
e
)
G(x∗)− 
which completes the proof.
Lastly, we prove our concentration guarantee for the output of the swap rounding algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 3. For now, fix a specific function fi. We will show that with high probability, the expected
value of fi on the empirical distribution is close to its expected value on the full distribution induced by
randomized swap rounding. At the end we will take a union bound over all fi ∈ F . Let R` be the random set
drawn in the `th iteration of randomized swap rounding. Let µ0 = Fi(x
K). Note that for all `, E[fi(R`)] ≥ µ0
via the guarantee for randomized swap rounding. Let Y =
∑r
`=1 fi(R`) and note that E[Y ] ≥ rµ0.
Our high-level approach is to apply Markov’s inequality to the random variable erµ0−Y . Let λ be an
arbitrary parameter in [0, 1] (later, we will set λ to get the best bound). For any single iteration of randomized
swap rounding, Chekuri et al. bound the exponential moment of the random variable λ(µ0 − fi(R`)) as
E[eλ(µ0−f(R`))] ≤ e2λ2µ0 .
Since rµ0 − Y =
∑r
`=1 µ0 − f(R`), we have
E
[
eλ(rµ0−Y )
]
= E
[
e
∑r
`=1 λ(µ0−f(R`))
]
= E
[
r∏
`=1
eλ(µ0−f(R`))
]
=
r∏
`=1
E
[
eλ(µ0−f(R`))
]
(independence)
≤ e2rλ2µ0 .
Applying Markov’s inequality yields
Pr[rµ0 − Y ≥ rµ0] = Pr
[
eλ(rµ0−Y ) ≥ erλµ0
]
≤ E
[
eλ(rµ0−Y )
]
erλµ0
≤ e2rλ2µ0−rλµ0
Taking λ = 4 , we obtain
Pr
[
1
r
r∑
`=1
fi(R`) ≤ (1− )µ0
]
= Pr[rµ0 − Y ≥ rµ0] ≤ e
−rµ02
8 .
We now distinguish two cases. First, µ0 < . Since fi(R`) ≥ 0 ∀i, `, 1r
∑r
`=1 fi(R`) ≥ µ0 −  holds
with probability 1. Second, µ0 ≥ . Here, we see that setting r = Θ
(
1
3
(
log |F|+ log 1δ
))
ensures that
1
r
∑r
`=1 fi(R`) ≥ (1 − )µ0 holds with probability at least 1 − δ|F| . Taking union bound over all fi ∈ F
completes the proof.
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